

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

A

NSC REFERRAL NOT REQUIRED

Ms. Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary  
National Security Council  
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Ms. Davis:

Enclosed herewith are my comments, as requested in your memorandum dated July 11, 1975, subject, The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (The Murphy Commission), on the recommendations contained in Chapter 7, "Intelligence," of the Murphy Commission report.

My views on the Commission recommendations in other chapters of the report will be submitted separately, including comments on the need for secrecy legislation and the importance of cover for CIA operations overseas.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

Enclosure:  
as stated

RECOMMENDATION (46)

The DCI should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.

\*\*\*

The DCI's relationship with the President depends on the President's preferences and working habits. Since the present DCI's office at Langley is only fifteen minutes from the White House, I see little value in establishing an additional office nearer, as access is easy any time the President desires it. I also believe it important that the DCI maintain a close relationship and full familiarity with the analytical base within CIA, upon which most of his substantive judgments are founded.

As for regular and direct contact with the President, again this must depend upon the President's preferences and working habits. Regular and direct contact does exist with the President in National Security Council meetings and special meetings called on particular subjects from time to time. In addition, I have no inhibitions against requesting a direct and even private meeting with the President on any occasion when this might be required. Normally, however, I believe it useful for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to be kept fully advised of the DCI's and the Agency's contacts with the President in order that the Assistant to the President fulfill his responsibilities to the President with respect to national security affairs.

RECOMMENDATION (47)

The CIA should be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA), and its Director the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI).

\*\*\*

I see no particular advantage to be gained by retitling the CIA as the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA) or changing the title of the Agency head to the Director of Foreign Intelligence. The change would be cosmetic and not substantive. It could do violence to the concept of "central intelligence" which was the primary purpose for the creation of CIA.

Putting more stress on the fact that the responsibilities of the DCI and the CIA are limited to foreign intelligence can be accomplished by inserting "foreign" in appropriate places in the basic legislation--as already has been proposed both by me and the Rockefeller Commission.

RECOMMENDATION (48)

In order to best utilize the PFIAB:

- each incoming President should review and make such changes in PFIAB's membership as may be required to give him high personal confidence in that body's values and judgement; that
- he make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB upon the latter's request; and that
- the PFIAB staff should be increased in size, and drawn in part from sources outside the intelligence community.

\*\*\*

I fully concur in this recommendation. As I noted in my 23 June 1974 comments on the Report to the President of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, I have the highest regard for the contribution which the PFIAB has made to the improvement of the intelligence structure of our Government to date, and I look forward to the Board's specific supervision and independent assessment of our performance in the future.

RECOMMENDATION (49)

Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed only when clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful process of high level review.

\*\*\*

I concur in the observation that covert action cannot be abandoned and should be employed when vital to our national goals, but only after a careful process of high level review.

RECOMMENDATION (50)

As the sensitivity and risks of covert action require appropriate review and consultation:

- covert action should only be authorized after collective consideration of its benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee members, and that,
- besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee should regularly review the continuing appropriateness of activities still being pursued.

\*\*\*

The recommendation is essentially sound; the President, of course, has the right in exceptional cases to establish special procedures.

RECOMMENDATION (51)

PL-93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement for the personal certification of the President as to their necessity.

\*\*\*

The establishment of a single, small and select joint committee of the Congress with a clearly defined role which could include a review of covert action programs would limit the proliferation of sensitive information. I concur in the Commission's recommendation that PL-93-559 be amended to omit any requirement for the personal certification of the President.

RECOMMENDATION (52)

The NSCIC should be actively used as the principal forum for the resolution, short of the President, of the differing perspectives of intelligence consumers and producers, and should meet frequently for that purpose.

\*\*\*

I believe this recommendation is well intentioned but is perhaps a little artificial. The members of the NSCIC have a number of important responsibilities, and any attempt to get them to meet "frequently" might lead to more form than substance in the relationship. It certainly is appropriate, however, that the guidance and needs of intelligence consumers should be made available to the Intelligence Community on a regular basis.

To achieve this, several steps have been taken. The NSCIC Working Group, now chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has been established to provide periodic staff-level identification of consumer needs and comments for submission to the members of the NSCIC. The Economic Intelligence Subcommittee of the NSCIC, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, has been organized to concentrate especially on the increasingly important subject of economic intelligence from the point of view of the consumers. Lastly, one of the motives for the establishment of the National Intelligence Officers, and a standing assignment of them, was to improve communication with customers in the specialized fields covered by these officers. With this structure of staff-level contact, I believe that occasional meetings of the NSCIC itself, focused on significant documents such as the DCI Perspectives, Key Intelligence Questions, etc., would be more fruitful than meetings of the principal members of the NSCIC "frequently."



RECOMMENDATION (53)

While the intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their improved competence in the analysis of international economic issues, the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisors must maintain similar capabilities. We believe that, in all four of the Departments, those capabilities should be significantly strengthened.

\*\*\*

This recommendation has considerable merit. International economic issues more often than not are complex, many-faceted, and elusive. Analysis from various departmental viewpoints can add to the overall understanding of the implications of these issues and give greater assurance that U.S. policymakers are informed of their full range of options. The benefits from strengthening the competence of all Washington economic agencies in international economic analysis will be even greater as these agencies perfect the means for sharing their analytical findings. Greater sharing of analytical products also will guard against unnecessary duplication of research.

RECOMMENDATION (54)

A small staff of the highest quality, drawn from within and without the intelligence community and responsible for the drafting and review of NIEs, should be established. This staff, reporting directly to the DFI, should be charged with reporting clearly any important differences in the views of concerned agencies, and the reasons for such differences.

\*\*\*

This recommendation clearly endeavors to recapture in a central office the drafting of national estimates, with the idea that these drafts be subject to later consultation with the member agencies of the Intelligence Community. I concur with the suggestion of an increase in the small editorial staff that assists the National Intelligence Officers in producing the best possible substantive and editorial national estimates. I believe, however, that the drafting function should not be constrained to a single staff, but should, at the National Intelligence Officers' option, be drafted centrally or assigned to one or another member of the Intelligence Community. I think the latter system is apt to surface more sharply differences in the judgments of the various member agencies of the Community than the rigid procedure of drafting centrally and seeking comments. The National Intelligence Officer structure is clearly an evolving institution and has no immutable character, but I think the purpose remains valid of using them as a way of improving communication among the experts within the Community, with our customers and with other talent outside the Community. I believe this communication is facilitated by keeping the National Intelligence Officer as a single staff officer responsible to the DCI rather than allowing this group of officers to develop a bureaucratic existence and life of their own. The Commission's recommendation, it appears to me, considers only the estimate function and tries to obtain the benefits of both the new National Intelligence Officer system and the old Board of National Estimates. I believe this is not entirely feasible, and my preference clearly is the National Intelligence Officer system as a way of more clearly identifying differences of view among the Community, improving our overall intelligence process of collection, processing and producing all sorts of intelligence (not estimates alone), and providing the DCI with substantive support in his managerial as well as his substantive responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION (55)

a. Under the direction of the DFI, the IC staff should expand "Perspectives for Intelligence" into an annually revised multi-year plan for the allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence community. The plan should be reviewed in USIB and approved by the NSCIC.

b. On the basis of the multi-year plan, the IC staff should prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget. After review by IRAC and OMB, this document should guide the budget submission of each of the agencies and departments of the intelligence community to OMB. It should also provide a basis for the consideration, by the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security, of the funds to be annually authorized the intelligence community.

\*\*\*

Reference 55a:

I do not consider that the "Perspectives for Intelligence" should become the vehicle to accomplish actions which are now and, in my view, should continue to be the responsibility of the National Security Council.

The annual "Perspectives" is intended as DCI guidance to the Community concerning problems expected to arise within the coming five years. It could quite logically become a multi-year plan which would identify, among other guidance, those aspects of the existing allocation of responsibilities to which study should be addressed. Any directives to reallocate major responsibilities on the basis of studies initiated in response to the "Perspectives" should require approval of the National Security Council itself.

Reference 55b:

Except for one essential difference, this recommendation reflects the present situation. The "Perspectives" is one of the documents now taken into consideration in the annual preparation of my recommendations for the national foreign intelligence program which I submit to the President through the OMB.

The essential difference, however, is that my recommendations to the President are based on a review of the budgets prepared elsewhere, primarily in the Department of Defense. My recommendations are meant as advice to the President on the overall intelligence program to aid him in assembling the budget he submits to the Congress and not as a guide for the initial preparation of the budget submissions of other agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community.

Recommendation 55b would make me responsible for before-the-fact budgetary guidance on intelligence matters to the statutory members of the National Security Council, which I do not consider appropriate.

The final sentence of the recommendation contemplates an annual authorization for appropriation of funds for the activities of CIA, a requirement that does not exist under current law (CIA Act of 1949). Such a new annual authorization request carries with it the same security problems as would an open budget for the CIA. Moreover, providing documents to the proposed Joint Committee which have been prepared as staff preparations for the President's Budget raises serious questions concerning the separation of powers.

RECOMMENDATION (55)

a. Under the direction of the DFI, the IC staff should expand "Perspectives for Intelligence" into an annually revised multi-year plan for the allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence community. The plan should be reviewed in USIB and approved by the NSCIC.

b. On the basis of the multi-year plan, the IC staff should prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget. After review by IRAC and OMB, this document should guide the budget submission of each of the agencies and departments of the intelligence community to OMB. It should also provide a basis for the consideration, by the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security, of the funds to be annually authorized the intelligence community.

\*\*\*

Reference 55a:

I concur in the general thrust of this recommendation, but the allocation of responsibilities among the various agencies of the Intelligence Community is not within my control.

The annual "Perspectives for Intelligence" is intended as a DCI guidance document applicable to the next five years. Developing the "Perspectives" into a multi-year plan which discusses the allocation of Community responsibilities could be a logical development from the present document, but such a plan would not be directive in nature. Directive authority rests with the National Security Council in such matters.

Reference 55b:

Except for one essential difference, this recommendation reflects the present situation. The "Perspectives" is one of the documents now taken into consideration in the annual preparation of my recommendations for the national foreign intelligence program which I submit to the President through the OMB.

The essential difference, however, is that my recommendations to the President are based on a review of the budgets prepared elsewhere, primarily in the Department of Defense. My recommendations are meant as advice to the President on the overall intelligence program to aid him in assembling the budget he submits to the Congress and not as a guide for the initial preparation of the budget submissions of other agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community.

Recommendation 55b would make me responsible for before-the-fact budgetary guidance on intelligence matters to the statutory members of the National Security Council, which I do not consider appropriate.

25-7304

DCI/IC-75-0651  
15 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Comments on Recommendations of the  
Murphy Commission

1. Attached for your signature is a letter (TAB A) for Ms. Jeanne W. Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, responding to her memorandum of July 11, 1975 (TAB B) which advised the President wished to receive comments on the recommendations of the Murphy Commission. Unclassified replies were requested, if possible.
2. The attached comments relate only to recommendations in Chapter 7, "Intelligence," deadline for which is 17 July. The IC Staff prepared the comments on recommendations 46, 47, 48, 52 and 55; the DDO on recommendations 49, 50 and 51; the DDI on 53, and the D/DCI/NIO on 54.
3. The NSC memorandum requested you comment on 16 recommendations in other chapters of the Commission report. Deadline for these is 21 July, and it is planned to have them ready for your consideration on 18 July. With these comments will be the statements you requested on the need for secrecy legislation and the importance of cover for CIA officers overseas. The entire list of 190 recommendations is being reviewed to see if there are any on which you should comment, other than those specifically listed by the NSC Staff.

Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

Attachments:  
as stated

STAT

COORDINATION:

DDA

DDI

DDO

DDS&T

D/DCI/NIO

Comptroller

OSC

IG

OLC

15 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975

15 JUL 1975

15 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975

16 JUL 1975



Distribution:

0 - Adsee.

~~1~~ - ER

1 - DDCI

1 - Each Coordinator

1 - CS/ICS

1 -

1 -

1 - D/DCI/IC

1 - AD/DCI/IC

1 - IC Registry

TAT

*w/2d A only*

TAT

DCI/ICS/CS/

(15 July 1975)

B

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Executive Registry

75-2389

July 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Acting Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Agriculture  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Secretary of Labor  
The Director, Office of Management  
and Budget  
The Executive Director, Council on  
International Economic Policy  
The Administrator, Agency for International  
Development  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Administrator, Energy Research and  
Development Administration  
The Chairman, Civil Service Commission  
The Assistant to the President, Domestic Council  
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: The Commission on the Organization  
of the Government for the Conduct of  
Foreign Policy (The Murphy Commission)

The President wishes to receive comments from the principal foreign  
affairs Departments and Agencies on the recommendations contained  
in the report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government  
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (The Murphy Commission).

Attached is a master list of all Commission recommendations. Beside each recommendation is an indication of those agencies whose comments are specifically requested. These designations are not exclusive, however, and agencies should feel free to comment on any recommendation.

Comments on the recommendations, signed by the Department or Agency head, should be submitted by Monday, July 21. However, comments on the Organization of Intelligence (recommendations 46-55) are due by close of business Thursday, July 17.

In addition, the departments are requested to submit their views on the broader issues dealt with in the report, such as Executive-Legislative relations, by Friday, July 25.

Comments should, if possible, be unclassified since they may receive further distribution.



Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE  
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT  
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

RECOMMENDATION (1)

State  
Defense  
OMB  
CIA

The defining characteristic of these tasks [of a Presidential staff] is that they embody staff responsibilities rather than line authority. They provide assistance to the President, not direction to departmental officials other than to convey Presidential instructions. There should be only one official with line responsibility in the White House, and that is the President himself.

RECOMMENDATION (2)

Having reviewed the responsibilities the Assistant for National Security Affairs must meet over the long term, we conclude that these responsibilities, involving essential personal assistance to the President, management of issues for Presidential decision, and the direction of the National Security Council staff, should normally in the future be performed by an individual with no other official responsibilities. The actual choice would of course rest with the President.

RECOMMENDATION (3)

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
OMB  
CEA  
CIEP

The membership of the National Security Council be expanded to include the Secretary of the Treasury, and its jurisdiction be enlarged to include major issues of international economic policy-making.

RECOMMENDATION (4)

State            On an ad hoc basis, the President should invite to NSC meetings  
Defense        at which issues with important domestic implications are being dis-  
OMB            cussed either Cabinet or staff officials concerned with domestic  
Domestic      policymaking.  
Council

RECOMMENDATION (5)

State            The position of Deputy Under Secretary for Management be  
                 elevated to Under Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION (6)

State            The Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance be  
AID            abolished, and its analytic functions be transferred to the proposed  
                 Assistant Secretary for Food, Population and Development Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION (7)

State            Under Secretary positions should be reserved for supervisory  
                 officers having responsibility for specific portions of the Depart-  
                 ment's work; for example, Political and Security Affairs, Economic  
                 and Scientific Affairs, and Management. Under Secretaries are  
                 senior officers by virtue of their direct management responsibilities  
                 for subordinate bureaus and their responsibility for regional bureau  
                 activities in their assigned functional areas. These positions should  
                 not normally be used for "ad hoc trouble shooters" or "roving  
                 ambassadors."

RECOMMENDATION (8)

State           The positions of Counselor of the Department and Ambassadors-at-Large should be used for the special assignments requiring senior attention, under the direction of the Secretary. The Counselor should remain a permanent position, while Ambassadors-at-Large should be appointed for shorter periods of time and specific projects.

RECOMMENDATION (9)

State           A senior Assistant to the President should be charged with  
Treasury   the central White House staff function in economic policy, both  
Commerce   domestic and foreign. Having direct personal access to the  
OMB       President and strong qualifications drawn from economic and/or  
CEA       business experience, this Assistant should participate or be represented in all relevant meetings of the National Security Council  
Domestic   and of domestic policymaking bodies (such as the Domestic Council,  
Council   the Troika or Economic Policy Board). He would be the Executive  
CIEP       Secretary and Director of staff of the proposed joint Subcouncil on  
            International Economic Policy.

RECOMMENDATION (10)

State           The President should appoint, and have available to him for  
Treasury       advice, a senior and representative group of people drawn from the  
Commerce      private sector who are well equipped by training and experience to  
OMB            assist in formulating foreign economic policy in the national interest-  
CEA            an International Economic Policy Advisory Board. The Board would  
Domestic      be provided a small secretariat to help prepare meetings, dissem-  
Council        inate information and focus discussion on relevant issues. It would  
CIEP           meet at least quarterly to review issues raised at its own initiative  
                or by the government. The Board should have direct access to the  
                President, and the President should himself take the initiative to  
                meet with it from time to time. The Board should have wide lati-  
                tude to set up ad hoc groups, commission studies and otherwise equip  
                it to carry out its functions. It should replace most, if not all existing  
                advisory groups dealing with aspects of international economic policy.

RECOMMENDATION (11)

State           In order to provide a focus for objective study of longer term  
Treasury       international economic problems and a more effective early warning  
Commerce      system for identifying the major related policy issues on the horizon,  
OMB            we believe an independent study group on international economic  
CEA            issues should be created under the auspices of the Council of Economic  
Domestic      Advisors.  
Council  
CIEP



RECOMMENDATION (12)

State  
Treasury  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
OMB  
CEA  
Domestic  
Council  
CIEP

The President should establish a joint subcouncil of the NSC and the Domestic Council and the Economic Policy Board (or whatever White House organizations should come to perform their functions). Members of this body, the Subcouncil on International Economic Policy, would be the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs, the Under Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Other subcabinet officers and agency heads would attend Subcouncil meetings as full members with respect to questions impinging significantly on their responsibilities.

Designation of a Chairman should be left to the President. However, we anticipate that normally the Subcouncil would be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy would serve as Executive Secretary of the Subcouncil and Director of its staff. The staff would be drawn in part from the staffs of its parent bodies but would function as the Assistant to the President's own staff.

The Subcouncil could create such committees or task forces as the President may deem necessary to assure adequate interagency attention to continuing issues of international economic policy and to special problems. The regular members of the Subcouncil normally would be represented on each such group, as would the staff of the Assistant to the President.

The CIEP should be abolished by Congress, and its staff should be used to strengthen the economic capability of the NSC and White House Domestic Council. Other interagency international economic policy bodies would be brought under the Subcouncil framework.

RECOMMENDATION (13)

State  
Treasury  
Commerce  
CEA  
Domestic  
Council  
CIEP

Maintaining the practice of submitting to Congress an annual Report of the President on International Economic Policy. This report should be prepared in conjunction with the State of the World Report recommended in Chapter 10 and should be submitted as part of that Report.

RECOMMENDATION (14)

State

The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs be retitled the Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs and that the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, together with the functional units of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, be reordered as four new, closely related bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Secretary responsible to the Under Secretary, as follows:

- (1) International Economic and Business Affairs (principally trade, monetary, and investment policy);
- (2) Energy, Transportation, and Communication Affairs;
- (3) Oceans, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs;
- (4) Food, Population, and Development Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION (15)

State

Larger numbers of career Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission should be appointed from among officers with economics training and background: senior officers at economically important consular posts should ordinarily be expected to have had economic and commercial exposure either in State or through assignment to another agency; the recruitment of professionally trained economists should be accelerated without requiring that they become part of the Foreign Service; and training programs in economics for Foreign Service Officers should be accelerated.

RECOMMENDATION (16)

State

Treasury  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
CIEP

Systematic personnel interchange at the middle-grade levels among the Departments and agencies with principal responsibilities for foreign economic policy be expanded.

RECOMMENDATION (17)

State  
Treasury  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
CIEP

As a consequence, the Commission supports flexibility in the use of multiagency participation in policy negotiations and implementation abroad. The State Department must retain overall coordinating responsibility; no international negotiations should proceed without its knowledge and approval. It should normally participate in the manning of international delegations, but need not automatically chair these, depending upon the substantive area. Overseas representation of domestic economic departments should continue in selected areas (e.g., agriculture and finance) so long as their representatives are under the control of the Ambassador.

RECOMMENDATION (18)

State  
Treasury  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
OMB

The present personnel interchange program between government and business should be expanded substantially. The Commission believes this program should be concentrated at the middle and junior, rather than at senior levels.

RECOMMENDATION (19)

State  
Treasury  
AID  
CIEP

The Commission, therefore, recommends that the Agency for International Development (AID) remain the State Department's operating arm for the implementation of bilateral foreign assistance.

RECOMMENDATION (20)

State  
Treasury  
AID  
CIEP

Accordingly, we endorse the continuation of primary Treasury Department responsibility for supervision of U.S. commitments to the international development institutions. Treasury should coordinate with the State Department concerning directives given U.S. representatives on the executive boards when political issues arise in connection with the policies and operations of these institutions.

RECOMMENDATION (21)

State           We do not, however, believe it is necessary or desirable to  
Treasury       establish within the United States Government a new agency, or  
Commerce       Special Representative, to control either international corporations  
CEA            or the flow of capital to or from this country.  
CIEP

RECOMMENDATION (22)

State           The Federal Energy Administration should provide the focus  
Defense        and leadership for carrying out the national energy policy. The  
Interior       State Department will have a crucial continuing role in bringing to  
FEA            bear on all aspects of the policy process the critical considerations  
ERDA           of security and diplomacy, and in coordinating and implementing the  
CIEP           foreign policy aspects of our energy policy.

RECOMMENDATION (23)

State           The Commission proposes that the Office of Export Administra-  
Treasury       tion in the Commerce Department be designated a central point of  
Defense        contact between the private sector and the government for the licen-  
Commerce       sing and surveillance of trade and investment with Communist countries.  
ACDA           Policy guidance for that office should be centralized in the Board of  
CIA            East-West Foreign Trade authorized by the Trade Act of 1974, and  
CIEP           consisting of Cabinet-level officials from each of the departments  
involved in export regulation. The Board should be backed up by  
a working group of officials from the same agencies.

RECOMMENDATION (24)

State                    Representatives of the academic and business communities  
Treasury                should be formed into technical advisory committees to assist the  
Commerce               Board in gauging existing foreign availability of proposed U.S.  
CEA                    exports, monitoring new technological developments and estab-  
CIEP                    lishing procedures for evaluating the success or failure to export  
                         control process itself.

RECOMMENDATION (25)

State                    We propose that, after the current [multilateral trade] negotiations  
Treasury                are concluded, the ongoing tasks of administration, negotiation and  
Commerce               coordination be accomplished by a transfer of the Office, under a  
CEA                    Special Ambassador, to the Department of State.  
CIEP

RECOMMENDATION (26)

State                    Broadening the current Security Assistance Program Review  
Treasury                Committee (SAPRC) into a standing committee of the NSC to serve  
Defense                as the primary forum for interagency review of all issues involving  
OMB                    arms transfers and security assistance.  
JCS

RECOMMENDATION (27)

State                    After a WSAG-level crisis, a crisis review group should assess  
Defense                the government's performance and, where appropriate, review and  
JCS                    reconsider contingency plans.  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (28)

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
OMB  
ACDA  
JCS  
CIA

Establishment of a National Security Review Committee (NSRC) to conduct a broad review, under the direction of the National Security Council principals, of the U.S. worldwide national security posture at the beginning of every new Administration. The review should involve the newly appointed senior officials and draw upon the views of the relevant departments. It should be directed by the President and his National Security Assistant.

RECOMMENDATION (29)

State  
Defense  
OMB  
ACDA  
JCS  
CIA

The President establish an Advisory Board on National Defense, composed of private citizens who are well equipped by training and experience to bring to bear on defense questions the views of American society, and to facilitate the communication of defense needs to the public. The Board should be provided with a small independent staff.

RECOMMENDATION (30)

State  
Defense

A single senior State official should be clearly identified as responsible, under the Secretary, for political-military and national security affairs. To accomplish this the position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs should be retitled Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs, and made directly responsible for the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance should be abolished.

RECOMMENDATION (31)

State           The selection and training of Foreign Service officers should recognize the need for competent and national security analysts in both Washington and abroad.

RECOMMENDATION (32)

State           Barriers and administrative inhibitions to the hiring of political-military specialists or to their lateral entry into Foreign Service ranks should be sharply reduced.

RECOMMENDATION (33)

State           The political-military capability of the regional bureaus in State should be upgraded.

RECOMMENDATION (34)

State           ACDA's external research program should be expanded, focusing  
Defense       on longer term problems and possibilities for arms control.  
ACDA

RECOMMENDATION (35)

State           The Director of ACDA should become a member of the proposed  
Defense       National Security Review Committee (NSRC).  
ACDA

RECOMMENDATION (36)

State  
Defense  
ACDA

The Director of ACDA should become a member of the proposed NSC Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Committee, and should enlarge ACDA's capability to assess the arms control implications of U.S. security assistance policy and arms sales.

RECOMMENDATION (37)

State  
Defense  
ACDA

ACDA should provide public information on arms control and disarmament matters, much as State is charged with explaining U.S. foreign policy.

RECOMMENDATION (38)

State  
Defense  
ACDA

In order to facilitate the strengthened role of ACDA, we propose that the Director of ACDA be established as principal adviser to the NSC on arms control and disarmament matters.

RECOMMENDATION (39)

Defense  
OMB  
Domestic  
Council

A new analysis capability should be created to support the Associate Director [of OMB] for National Security and International Programs, and to provide sustained attention to broad defense policy and program issues in OMB and in the proposed NSRC.



State  
Defense  
OMB  
Domestic  
Council

The OMB should take the lead in organizing a continuing inter-agency program of overall resource-allocation analyses, specifically including the trade-offs of defense against civil programs.

RECOMMENDATION (41)

Defense  
OMB  
Domestic  
Council

A more determined effort should be made by OMB and the White House to inject Presidentially-approved fiscal guidance into the defense programming cycle at budget preview time (mid-June to mid-July), and to come to grips with the major defense program issues relating to this guidance at that time. OMB participation with OSD in the Joint Budget Review should be extended to the Program Review in May-August.

RECOMMENDATION (42)

Defense  
OMB  
Domestic  
Council

The President's fiscal policy guidance to DOD should be provided in both total obligational authority and outlay terms.

RECOMMENDATION (43)

State  
Defense  
OMB  
Domestic  
Council

There should be continuing contact and support throughout the year between staff of the NSC, the State Department and OMB in defining issues, conducting special studies, and seeing that the results of such studies are reflected in the defense budget process.

/[of Defense]

State  
Defense  
OMB

The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs should play an increased role in shaping the defense program and budget to fit our foreign policy. This requires that ISA develop greater technical and analytical capability, and that it take the lead in research and analyses to better relate force levels to foreign policy implications of major resource decision.

RECOMMENDATION (45)

/[of Defense]

Defense  
JCS

The Secretary's ability to exercise his statutory responsibilities in direction and control of crisis operations should be improved. Specific measures to bring this about include: provisions to insure the responsiveness of the National Military Command Center to the operational reporting needs of the Secretary (the Chairman and service chiefs would be informed simultaneously); increased autonomy for the Chairman in operational matters vis-a-vis the services (the role of service chiefs in operations should be explicitly defined as advisory to the Chairman and Secretary, service operational staffs should be sharply cut back and, if necessary, the joint operations staff, J-3, should be increased); the Chairman in consultation with the Secretary should select officers for key Joint Staff positions in operational matters, including the top officers in J-3 and the NMCC.

RECOMMENDATION (46)

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
Justice  
CIA

The DCI should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.

RECOMMENDATION (47)

The CIA should be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA), and its Director the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI).

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
Justice  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (48)

In order to best utilize the PFIAB:

- each incoming President should review and make such changes in PFIAB's membership as may be required to give him high personal confidence in that body's values and judgement; that
- he make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB upon the latter's request; and that
- the PFIAB staff should be increased in size, and drawn in part from sources outside the intelligence community.

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
Justice  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (49)

Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed only when clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful process of high level review.

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
Justice  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (50)

State As the sensitivity and risks of covert action require appropriate  
Treasury review and consultation:  
Defense  
Justice  
CIA

- covert action should only be authorized after collective consideration of its benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee members, and that,
- besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee should regularly review the continuing appropriateness of activities still being pursued.

RECOMMENDATION (51)

State PL-93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to  
Treasury the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any  
Defense requirement for the personal certification of the President as to  
Justice their necessity.  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (52)

State The NSCIC should be actively used as the principal forum for  
Treasury the resolution, short of the President, of the differing perspectives  
Defense of intelligence consumers and producers, and should meet frequently  
Justice for that purpose.  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (53)

State                While the intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their  
Treasury           improved competence in the analysis of international economic issues,  
Defense           the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, and  
Justice           the Council of Economic Advisors must maintain similar capabilities  
Agriculture       focused on the analysis of issues involving their own responsibilities.  
Commerce       We believe that, in all four of the Departments, those capabilities  
CEA               should be significantly strengthened.  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (54)

State               A small staff of the highest quality, drawn from within and without  
Treasury           the intelligence community and responsible for the drafting and review  
Defense           of NIEs, should be established. This staff, reporting directly to the  
Justice           DFI, should be charged with reporting clearly any important dif-  
CIA               ferences in the views of concerned agencies, and the reasons for such  
                     differences.

RECOMMENDATION (55)

State               a. Under the direction of the DFI, the IC staff should expand  
Treasury           "Perspectives for Intelligence" into an annually revised multi-  
Defense           year plan for the allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence  
Justice           community. The plan should be reviewed in USIB and approved by the  
OMB               NSCIC.

b. On the basis of the multiyear plan, the IC staff should prepare  
an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget. After review by  
IRAC and OMB, this document should guide the budget submission of  
each of the agencies and departments of the intelligence community  
to OMB. It should also provide a basis for the consideration, by the  
proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security, of  
the funds to be annually authorized the intelligence community.

RECOMMENDATION (56)

State  
Treasury  
Defense  
Justice  
OMB  
CIA

The executive branch foreign affairs agencies should seek adequate funding for the specific purpose of developing more comprehensive public affairs programs.

RECOMMENDATION (57)

State  
Defense  
OMB  
USIA

The International Education Act of 1966, or an equivalent act to develop and support programs of advanced and undergraduate international studies, should be funded. Its objectives might be broadened to include programs designed to provide (a) extensive research in foreign policy fields and (b) better substantive training for journalists.

RECOMMENDATION (58)

State  
Defense  
USIA

Forums for interchange of views and opinion between government, particularly the State Department, and the public be expanded.

RECOMMENDATION (59)

State  
AID

Because of the importance of the functions of the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (D/HIA), its director should have the title of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

RECOMMENDATION (60)

State           The Department of State should create an Advisory Committee on Human Rights to advise the Department on U.S. policy with respect to international human rights issues. This committee should include selected representatives of nongovernmental organizations, scholars, Members of Congress, churchmen, and others active in the Human Rights field.

RECOMMENDATION (61)

State           Decisions involving the use of force should be made with prior  
Defense       recognition of their ethical implications and standing in law.

RECOMMENDATION (62)

State           The Department of State should make instruction in ethical and human rights considerations an integral part of the basic training of Foreign Service Officers and of the various area studies programs.

RECOMMENDATION (63)

State           The U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission should be a full time official of ambassadorial rank and assigned broad responsibility for human rights considerations inherent in all U.S. participation at the United Nations. If necessary, the Ambassador should be provided with additional staff for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION (64)

State            Chiefs of missions in sensitive human rights areas should assign personnel to monitor and report on Human Rights issues.

RECOMMENDATION (65)

State            The Executive Development Staff of the Foreign Affairs Executive Service (proposed in the Personnel Chapter of this Report) should be given responsibility for identifying qualified individuals throughout the government, and for recommendation to the President as potential ambassadorial nominees. Similarly, when circumstances call for appointment of individuals outside the government, whether from business, labor, or the academic world, they should be appointed; the guiding principle must be to match job needs with the best qualified individual available.

RECOMMENDATION (66)

State            It should become accepted and standard operating procedure  
Defense        that communications to and from all Embassy personnel of all  
CIA            agencies be available to the Ambassador, either in advance or  
                after dispatch, at his discretion.

RECOMMENDATION (67)

State            Control of diplomatic cryptographic facilities be fully in the  
Defense        hands of the Department of State.  
AID



RECOMMENDATION (68)

State           The Under Secretary of State for Management should be assigned  
Defense       direct authority for communications, including Foreign Service  
Commerce     reporting, and should establish a staff to carry out this responsibility.  
CIA           This staff should take the lead--with the collaboration of the Bureau  
              of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Regional Bureaus, the  
              Foreign Affairs Institute (FAI), and the Executive Secretariat -- in  
              making the Embassy communications system and particularly  
              Foreign Service reporting more effective in scope, content and form.  
              In so doing it will need to make systematic studies of needs of the  
              many disparate users-- starting with the President and Secretary--  
              of Foreign Service reporting, and communications generally, and to  
              devise ways for fulfilling those needs.

RECOMMENDATION (69)

State           INR should work actively with such a Foreign Service Reporting  
Defense       Staff, to relate Foreign Service reporting effectively to the needs of  
CIA           the intelligence community, and should be staffed adequately to  
              fulfill this role.

RECOMMENDATION (70)

State           The Foreign Affairs Institute, in coordination with the Foreign  
              Service Reporting Staff, should significantly improve its course  
              offerings and in-service university enrollments to train officers to  
              fulfill the assessment role in Foreign Service Reporting.

RECOMMENDATION (71)

State  
Commerce      At many posts abroad, political and economic sections in the Embassies should be merged. Integrated, comprehensive reporting and assessment which considers economic and political issues in their close relationship are what we believe will be most needed; a combined section would enhance the likelihood of it being produced. It would also help to encourage FSO's serving abroad to pay more attention to the economic aspects of our bilateral relations.

RECOMMENDATION (72)

State  
Treasury      The Ambassador should have a full opportunity to comment on any change in the staff complements of each agency at his post, and his word should carry great weight even if it is not the determining factor.  
Defense  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
Labor  
AID  
CIA  
USIA

RECOMMENDATION (73)

State  
Treasury      The Department of State should provide managerial and administrative services for the entire mission.  
Defense  
Agriculture  
Commerce  
Labor  
AID  
CIA  
USIA

RECOMMENDATION (74)

State  
OMB      Ambassadors should frequently consult in the Department of State and elsewhere in Washington, perhaps several times a year in addition to leave, depending on specific needs. On a somewhat less frequent basis, DCMs and section heads should come to Washington for consultation, and, conversely, Country Directors, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of geographic bureaus should spend a substantial portion of their time in the field. The Department's budget requests, and Congressional response to them, should reflect this need.

State            Regional conferences of key personnel from Washington and the  
OMB            various missions should be held more frequently than the current  
                 chiefs of mission conferences.

RECOMMENDATION (76)

State            The Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Affairs, be  
Treasury        mandated to inspect the overseas activities of all U.S. agencies  
Defense        associated with Embassies and Consulates, in addition to those of  
Agriculture    the Department of State.  
Commerce  
AID  
CIA

RECOMMENDATION (77)

State            Each incoming administration should create a nonpartisan com-  
                 mission, including representatives of the Congress, charged with  
                 reassessing on a broad front U.S. participation in multilateral  
                 agencies and programs, and recommending changes in our policies  
                 and programs as necessary.

RECOMMENDATION (78)

State            The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) should  
                 be reconstituted as a smaller Bureau for United Nation Affairs,  
                 serving primarily as a Washington point of reference for U.S. mis-  
                 sions in New York and Geneva, and responsible for international  
                 organization budgetary contributions and international conference  
                 support. IO's policymaking functions should be allocated to functional  
                 bureaus for the relevant issue areas, and through them, to the  
                 functional Under Secretaries. Responsibility for arranging inter-  
                 national Conferences might go to the Under Secretary for management.

RECOMMENDATION (79)

State           The multilateral policy function for such issues of global inter-dependence should be allocated to the Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs. The policy function for political or military multilateral issues, such as peacekeeping, should be assigned to the new Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION (80)

State           In most policy areas the Department of State should select the heads of delegations for multilateral negotiations, seeking the best qualified individuals in or out of government.

RECOMMENDATION (81)

State  
CSC           Staffing for permanent missions should be accomplished through both the Foreign Service and Civil Service systems. Assignment, training, and promotion practices should be devised which (a) develop a measure of expertise in multilateral diplomacy without creating a separate core of specialists, and (b) permit wide flexibility to utilize substantive specialists from many agencies.

RECOMMENDATION (82)

State           The head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. should be a prominent personage with a close relationship to the President, and should hold Cabinet rank.

RECOMMENDATION (83)

State           The appointment of Members of Congress to international delegations whenever feasible, as a particularly useful way of keeping Congress involved and informed about multilateral foreign policy issues.

RECOMMENDATION (84)

State           Programs which project and explain U.S. foreign policy, now  
USIA           split between the State Department and USIA, should be combined in a new State Department Office of Policy information.

RECOMMENDATION (85)

State           All general (non-policy) information and cultural activities  
OMB           which are now carried out by the Department of State or the U.S.  
USIA           Information Agency, other than those of the VOA, should be combined in a new semi-autonomous (or associated) Information and Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA). The ICA Director would report to the Secretary of State, or alternatively, if the President wishes, the Director could report directly to the President while receiving day-to-day policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

RECOMMENDATION (86)

State           The Voice of America should be set up as an independent federal  
OMB           agency under a Board of Governors, with a mandate to broadcast  
USIA           accurate, objective, and comprehensive news as well as to represent American society in its totality, and with the State Department responsible for that portion of its programming which presents or explains U.S. foreign policy.

State

The practice of developing and making public a periodic Presidential "State of the World Report" be reintroduced.

RECOMMENDATION (88)

State  
Defense  
CIA

A "Global Systems Critical List of Problems and Opportunities" be authorized by act of Congress to be prepared by an organization such as the National Academy of Sciences.

RECOMMENDATION (89)

State  
Defense  
OMB  
CEA  
CIA

The President should create a Council of International Planning (CIP), modeled in structure on the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), to serve him directly and in a manner of his choosing in the planning of foreign policy.

RECOMMENDATION (90)

State

A single, highly competent officer, personally selected by the Secretary, should be given full time responsibility for the work on the "State of the World Report."

RECOMMENDATION (91)

State Regular members of the Policy Planning Staff would normally be expected to involve themselves at one time or another in each of the planning functions -- anticipation, challenge, reevaluation, and the formulation of strategic concepts.

RECOMMENDATION (92)

State The Director of the Policy Planning Staff should have one deputy to lead the work of the staff in fulfilling the role of anticipation and initiatives, and another deputy responsible principally for the challenge and reevaluation functions.

RECOMMENDATION (93)

State An Advisory Committee be created by the State Department, consisting of outside scholars and experts who can assist the Planning Staff keep abreast of new developments of substantive and methodological kinds. An officer of the Policy Planning Staff should be charged with matching the Staff's needs with outside researchers best qualified to meet them, and with being its link to the Advisory Committee and the external research community.

RECOMMENDATION (94)

State The President should direct a key foreign policy advisor (logically the Deputy Secretary of State) to become more deeply involved in the review of significant budget and related activities of foreign affairs agencies and domestic agencies which have international implications; thus to ensure that these programs effectively express the President's foreign policy objectives.

OMB  
Domestic  
Council

RECOMMENDATION (95)

State  
OMB

Particularly close relations between OMB and NSC should be developed: the OMB director and his staff should participate more in the foreign policymaking process, and NSC personnel must be involved in the budget process.

RECOMMENDATION (96)

State  
OMB

A limited interchange of personnel of State, NSC, and OMB should be instituted to improve these interfaces. In addition procedures for assessing the cross-agency budgetary impact of new international commitments should be reviewed and modified as appropriated.

RECOMMENDATION (97)

State  
OMB

The State Department, through the Deputy Secretary, should continue to lead in extending Foreign affairs programming techniques on a selective, step-by-step basis, supported by NSC and OMB. Responsibility of the Assistant Secretaries of State for the coordination of government programs in regions and countries should be reaffirmed.

RECOMMENDATION (98)

State  
OMB

Annual policy and program reviews of specific country and regional programs should be instituted with recommendations by the Assistant Secretaries on agency programs to be cycled into the budget process.



RECOMMENDATION (99)

State            Staff capabilities in regional bureaus for program analysis and  
OMB            coordination should be appropriately strengthened.

RECOMMENDATION (100)

State            The foreign policy machinery (NSC and State) should continue  
to direct from time to time country and regional studies by ad hoc  
teams with designated leadership where the above cited interagency  
programming reviews might not produce the "fresh" policy options  
and resource analysis required in the President's perspective.

RECOMMENDATION (101)

State            Ambassadors, particularly in large countries, should promote  
OMB            country programming techniques to meet their managerial needs.  
These efforts should be directly integrated with State-led regional  
and country reviews and with the agency-based budget processes.

RECOMMENDATION (102)

The two foreign relations committees should be given opportunity to review and comment on the views and estimates of the Appropriations Committees (submitted by March 15 to the House and Senate Budget Committees) so that the latter committees could consider the foreign policy implications of the recommendations on appropriation items (for example, on agricultural production or defense posture).

RECOMMENDATION (103)

The two foreign relations committees should have representation on the Budget Committees of both Houses to improve consideration of issues which relate to domestic and international considerations.

RECOMMENDATION (104)

Congress should move to simplify the process either by (a) limiting the authorization bills to general levels of expenditure and by placing more detailed revisions in more permanent legislation not repeated each year (e. g., AID and MAP), or (b) adopting multi-year authorizations which could focus review more effectively on the direction and longer-term effectiveness of programs.

RECOMMENDATION (105)

/ [State]

State

The Department should develop an annual manpower plan in which each bureau chief should specify the kinds and mix of functional and bilateral competence required for a 3-year period and the way in which this talent will be acquired or developed.

RECOMMENDATION (106)

State

Within the annual plan, to be approved by the Secretary, bureau chiefs (function and geographic) should proceed to acquire the personnel required, making effective use of all personnel authorities without case-by-case approval of personnel authorities.

RECOMMENDATION (107)

State  
CSC

A viable professional system within the Civil Service authority should be developed for adequate career appointments to attract and retain qualified personnel.

RECOMMENDATION (108)

State  
CSC

The Department should request the necessary GS supergrades to provide meaningful career ladders in the Civil Service category.

RECOMMENDATION (109)

State

Functional bureau directors should participate in the informal FSO assignments process and career planning to the same extent that geographic bureaus do.

RECOMMENDATION (110)

State

The Foreign Service should be recruited, trained, and sized to its historic mission--that of representing U.S. interests in foreign countries. This requires people willing to and psychologically attuned to serve in alien and difficult situations and who have strong basic competence in area studies and language.

RECOMMENDATION (111)

State        A major change in emphasis, however, should be directed toward improvement in rigorous short and longer term assessment of U.S. interests and analytic reporting.

RECOMMENDATION (112)

State        The officers should be broadened by experience and training for the new assessment emphasis, particularly in the area of economics.

RECOMMENDATION (113)

State        Responsibility for Department-wide personnel management functions should be centered in the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, who should be made Under Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION (114)

State        A modern, professional personnel function should be established at the Department level, with a Director reporting to the Under Secretary for Management. His task would be to see that viable careers are developed within all personnel categories and that all systems work to the full benefit of the Department.

RECOMMENDATION (115)

State        The Director General of the Foreign Service should report to the Director of Personnel and should focus upon the administration of the high mobility officer component (FSOs) within prescribed Departmental policy.

RECOMMENDATION (116)

State        The Board of the Foreign Service should be reviewed and reoriented to a new cross-agency mission as discussed above. The Under Secretary for Management should lead the review and be designated Chairman of the reconstituted Board.

RECOMMENDATION (117)

State        The Under Secretary for Management should be responsible for developing, for the Secretary's approval, an annual Department manpower plan as a vehicle for determining the needs for and deployment of people and skills over 3-5 years.

RECOMMENDATION (118)

State        The Policy Planning Staff should play a key role in developing for the Secretary's approval basic guidance as to the policy directions, shifts in deployment emphasis at overseas posts, and critical competences to be acquired.

State        The Under Secretary for Management should establish an Executive Development Program administered by a professional staff reporting directly to him (outside but related to regular Personnel functions).

RECOMMENDATION (120)

State        Promotions to designated executive jobs (largely FSO-2 and  
CSC        GS-16 and above) should be subject to special procedures of a Foreign Affairs Executive Service (FAES).

RECOMMENDATION (121)

State        Candidates would be "selected in" to executive jobs in the FAES  
CSC        by the Secretary on the basis of recommendations from line managers and the executive development staff.

RECOMMENDATION (122)

State        The purpose of the Executive Development program would be  
CSC        to find the best talent from all categories within the Department based on the Secretary's defined needs. It should be part of a community-wide approach.

RECOMMENDATION (123)

State        A substantial improvement be made in job description and classi-  
CSC        fication practices for all positions in the field and in Washington.  
This is a prerequisite for responsible personnel management.

RECOMMENDATION (124)

State        Rank-in-the-man should run only through 03. All promotions to  
01 and 02 should be related to specific jobs.

RECOMMENDATION (125)

State        Greater emphasis should be placed on performance and account-  
ability in the job through annual work statement.

RECOMMENDATION (126)

State        The Service should adopt some form of "climate analysis" or  
reverse appraisal to get a better understanding of officer views of  
the performance of supervisors.

RECOMMENDATION (127)

State        The cone system should be continued (although the program  
direction cone would be rendered superfluous by the executive devel-  
opment recommendations). Its basic purpose is to protect the con-  
sular and administrative activities as viable career specialties and  
to continue to upgrade the economic competence of the Service.  
Its continued effectiveness should be reviewed from time to time.

RECOMMENDATION (128)

State All political officers should have the 26-week FSI course in economics or its equivalent. The techniques, as well as substance, are essential to good policy analysis.

RECOMMENDATION (129)

State Over time, the distinction between political and economic cones should be dropped. Economics today provides a major context to all international relations.

RECOMMENDATION (130)

State Intercone assignments should be increased where the purpose is to broaden experience, rather than to accommodate an excess of political officers. The exchange should be a two-way street where Consular and Administrative officers receive political assignments.

RECOMMENDATION (131)

State Officers should be given incentives to pursue deeper substantive issues of foreign policy. They should be rewarded for initiative (self study) and excellence in their chosen fields through promotions, assignments in their chosen fields, awards, and mid-career work-study programs.



State        The Board of Examiners should be abolished and the Department establish a professional recruitment capability within its personnel management function.

RECOMMENDATION (133)

State        The examination procedures, written and oral, should be revised to place more emphasis on testing aptitudes, creativity, and analytic capabilities than specific knowledge. New techniques being employed in industry can be adopted for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION (134)

State        The time from examination to entrance into the service should be sharply shortened to fit more nearly the needs of high-quality applicants.

RECOMMENDATION (135)

State        The Department should systematically interview officials of colleges and universities to determine whether the Foreign Service is obtaining the best qualified students from among those who might be interested in a foreign affairs career.

RECOMMENDATION (136)

State More weight should be given to recruiting people at the graduate level or who have demonstrated desired competence in specialties, especially those with economic training and experience.

RECOMMENDATION (137)

State The Department should review entering salaries and take steps to  
OMB ensure that the Foreign Service is reasonably competitive with other areas of Government and industry for the kind of talent it seeks.

RECOMMENDATION (138)

State For the first two tours of duty, or through the 06 level, Departmental entrants should be on probationary status. Following careful screening and the junior threshold review, the individual would be given tenured officer status.

RECOMMENDATION (139)

State The individual should be able to opt at this point for a predominantly Washington or mobility career and for his area of specialization.

State Lateral transfers should be actively recruited--particularly of  
CSC people with demonstrated economic or appropriate technical expertise.

RECOMMENDATION (141)

State A new system be installed of semiautomatic promotions in the  
middle grades from FS 0-5 through FS 0-3. The junior threshold  
examination (FS 0-6 to FS 0-5) should be continued.

RECOMMENDATION (142)

State Provision should be made for more rapid promotion based on  
exceptional performance on the job, and for "passing over promo-  
tion" for those with less satisfactory performance in a given period,  
but who might not be eligible for selection out in the current environ-  
ment.

RECOMMENDATION (143)

State Selection out for time in class and low performance should be  
continued but adapted to the semi-automatic promotion approach.

RECOMMENDATION (144)

State The Department should seek authority for 20-year retirement to  
OMB help reduce the pressures toward overstaffing in higher grades and to  
permit officers who are not selected into the Executive Service to pur-  
sue second careers.

RECOMMENDATION (145)

State The Under Secretary for Management should exercise greater  
oversight over the assignment process.

RECOMMENDATION (146)

State        A form of job posting should be adopted under which all officers are notified of assignments coming vacant and have an opportunity to make their preferences known and to participate in career planning.

RECOMMENDATION (147)

State        All FSO jobs should be rigorously reexamined to determine which can be reclassified downward and made available to more junior officers. This should apply to ambassadorial and DCM positions.

RECOMMENDATION (148)

State        Routine jobs at the bottom of the Service should be reviewed be sure they require university trained "generalists." Those jobs which do not should be filled from other sources of talent as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION (149)

State        The 200 or so stepping-stone jobs which provide managerial experience should be clearly identified and husbanded for development of those with indicated management potential.

RECOMMENDATION (150)

State        More assignments should be made outside the State Department  
OMB        in jobs with managerial and programmatic content. State should  
CSC        take initiative to reinvigorate and expand the exchange programs  
            underway.

RECOMMENDATION (151)

State        All DCM's at larger posts (Class I and II) should have had a  
            prior tour of duty with significant management experience in or  
            out of State.

RECOMMENDATION (152)

State        "Leave-without-pay" service outside the Executive Branch in  
OMB        activities which broaden managerial or functional experience should  
CSC        be encouraged, and the service outside should count for purposes  
            of promotion and retirement. Such services could include industry  
            (e. g., petroleum, banking), foundations, universities, congressional  
            staffs, or state and local governments.

RECOMMENDATION (153)

State        The detail of FSO's to state and local governments should be  
OMB        effectively implemented under the Pearson Act. (This will require  
            changes in the law and appropriations limitations.)

RECOMMENDATION (154)

State  
OMB

For high performance/potential officers, a new program should be mounted for deepening functional competence through one-year periods of work-study at mid-career levels (12-15 years in the service), to be designed by the officers involved, with guidance and approval by the Department.

RECOMMENDATION (155)

State  
OMB  
AID  
CSC

a. The executive branch and Congress should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the role and scope of the economic development program. An effective personnel program cannot be operated in the present conditions of uncertainty. It is a propitious time to reexamine AID's longer-term mission.

b. If the program is to be continued, AID or its successor agency should develop a "compatible" but separate personnel system designed to attract and retain high-quality development professionals.

RECOMMENDATION (156)

State  
USIA  
CSC

USIA's personnel system, under the new agency we have proposed, should continue as a separate system with "compatible" regulations. FSIO's should not be merged as a cone of the FSO Corps. The new agency should develop the unique kind of staff required to coordinate and manage the increasingly important exchanges and contracts through private channels.

RECOMMENDATION (157)

State           The President should direct key domestic agencies (through the  
OMB           Secretary of State, OMB, and the Civil Service Commission) to take  
CSC           steps to strengthen their personnel systems in order to participate  
more effectively in the development and execution of foreign policy.

RECOMMENDATION (158)

State           General rules and standards should be issued to guide develop-  
OMB           ment of a family of compatible, agency-run systems.  
CSC

RECOMMENDATION (159)

State           The President designate certain executive jobs and the men who  
Defense hold them as part of a Foreign Affairs Executive Service. The  
OMB           designated jobs would be filled only after a systematic executive  
CSC           search across the various agencies' feeder systems.

RECOMMENDATION (160)

State           The President should instruct the Head of each Agency involved  
Defense to improve Executive Development Programs within his agency,  
OMB           based on policy guidelines to ensure that each "feeder" system  
CSC           makes an optimum contribution to the government-wide approach.

RECOMMENDATION (161)

State a. Prime responsibility for support of the President in implementing  
Defense the Foreign Affairs Executive Service would be placed in the Secretary  
OMB of State, under a Presidential charter. It would be accomplished  
CSC largely through expansion of the Executive Development Staff  
reporting to the Under Secretary for Management.

b. This staff should also organize an annual executive manpower review to monitor progress of agency programs and key individuals with executive potential.

RECOMMENDATION (162)

State The FSI program should be expanded to handle the principal  
Defense language and foreign affairs training for all agencies. Its name  
CIA should be changed to Foreign Affairs Institute (FAI) to recognize the broader mission.

RECOMMENDATION (163)

State The funding of FAI should be made entirely reimbursable with  
OMB State and other participants paying their share of the costs in the form of tuition. A revolving fund should be established to permit financial planning on a long-term basis.

RECOMMENDATION (164)

State Steps should be taken to provide better FAI facilities in the  
OMB Washington area. Appropriations should be sought for this purpose.



RECOMMENDATION (165)

State

State should develop a process for providing an annual statement of training requirements and for evaluation of performance in meeting those requirements.

RECOMMENDATION (166)

State

OMB

AID

USIA

a. Revoke E. O. 11636 as it now stands.

b. Continue to exempt Foreign Service Officers as Presidential appointees from the main provisions of E. O. 11491.

c. Extend a similar exemption to FSIO's and FSR's of the three agencies--i. e., all rank-in-the-man professionals.

d. Provide for representation of the above officers through AFSA, or other organizations, as professional associations.

e. Provide all other employees of State, AID, and USIA representation and bargaining rights under E. O. 11491.

RECOMMENDATION (167)

State

a. Establish a single focal point in State for mobilizing the necessary management resources to conduct effective EMR [Employee-Management Relations]: the proposed Under Secretary for Management, supported by an experienced professional staff with continuity.

b. Enforce the use of this Office as the management channel in dealing with employee organizations.

c. Clarify the EMR policies.

RECOMMENDATION (168)

State  
Labor  
OMB  
AID  
USIA  
CSC

a. The Board of the Foreign Service should be taken out of the employee-management relations business. In its place, general oversight should be given to a new seven-man Foreign Affairs Council composed of representatives of State (two members including the chairman), AID, USIA, Labor, CSC and OMB who have expertise in the EMR field. The council would be advisory to the Secretary as to the operation of the EMR system and as to policy required to make the system work.

b. The Disputes Panel should continue to settle all cases brought, subject only to review by the heads of Foreign Affairs agencies.

c. There should be provision for fixed-period contracts, thus eliminating the current "rolling" negotiations.

d. Interagency consultation requirements should be strengthened.

e. Discretionary benefits should be removed from the bargaining either by amending the Order or by assigning the determination to OMB, CSC, or some agency outside State.

RECOMMENDATION (169)

The Congress should adopt, by concurrent resolution, a statement that a national commitment--meaning a promise to assist a foreign country, government or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events--results only from affirmative action taken by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.

RECOMMENDATION (170)

The national emergencies should be terminated by law and that all statutes delegating authority in time of national emergency should be repealed or revised to conform to the provisions of the proposed Nation Emergencies Act.

RECOMMENDATION (171)

Any future declarations of national emergency should specify the statutory powers required to meet such an emergency; that all national emergencies should be terminable at any time by concurrent resolution or by Presidential proclamation; and that in the absence of extension by Congress, provision should be made for termination.

RECOMMENDATION (172)

Congress should establish procedures to limit the occasions for dispute between the two branches, and to provide for the swiftest resolution of conflicts should they arise. These procedures should regularize the process whereby either House or a committee of either House may seek information. They should also establish the steps whereby, if that information is denied and the House or committee in question should deem the claim of privilege unjustified, the matter can be referred to the federal courts for expeditious resolution.

RECOMMENDATION (173)

We propose that the Congress consider legislation establishing a comprehensive system for classification based on the following guidelines:

- a. The mandatory classification, in one of several degrees of classification, of specified types of information relating principally to the national defense and the sources and methods of intelligence.
- b. The mandatory exemption from classification of other specified types of information, relating principally to U.S. actions in violation of U.S. law.
- c. The discretion, lodged in appropriate officials, to classify or exempt from classification all other information on the basis of specified criteria which balance the need for secrecy against the potential value of disclosure.
- d. A comprehensive system of automatic downgrading and declassification.
- e. The application of specified sanctions to persons violating the terms of the system, including criminal penalties for the unauthorized release of properly classified information, and significant administrative sanctions applicable to over-classification.
- f. The availability of legal process to resolve any questions arising from classification decisions.

RECOMMENDATION (174)

In both the review of candidates and in the consideration of nominees, the Senate should continue to require of persons under consideration familiarity either with the country to which the nominee is to be accredited, or experience in the formulation or practice of U.S. foreign policy, or some other substantial and relevant set of qualifications.

RECOMMENDATION (175)

The Commission recommends greater use of report-back requirements for both executive testimony and written reports from executive officials to the Congress, and more frequent incorporation of statutory time limits in proposed legislation, particularly on new programs and policies.

RECOMMENDATION (176)

In the House we propose that the Committee on International Relations be accorded "special oversight functions" over reciprocal tariff agreements, in addition to its other responsibilities for trade policy issues.

The House Committee on International Relations should exercise concurrent legislative oversight over international financial organizations, together with the House Committee on Banking and Currency.

RECOMMENDATION (178)

From the point of view of improving Congress' ability to consider foreign policy matters efficiently and effectively, therefore, a review by the Senate of its own committee system now seems appropriate. The Commission strongly recommends such a review.

RECOMMENDATION (179)

The Commission recommends fuller utilization of subcommittees to strengthen the basis of committee action, and to provide greater interchange with working-level executive officials at the Assistant and Under Secretary levels. It also recommends increased use of joint hearings by subcommittees to meet part of the need, expressed clearly in Congressional responses to the survey, conducted by this Commission, for better coordination of the actions of the Congress in the foreign policy field.

RECOMMENDATION (180)

In the Commission's view, a Joint Committee on National Security should be established. It should perform for the Congress the kinds of policy review and coordination now performed in the executive branch by the National Security Council, and provide a central point of linkage to the President and to the officials at that Council. In addition it should take responsibility for Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community.

RECOMMENDATION (181)

The Commission recommends that the Joint Committee be vested with the following specific jurisdictions and authorities:

- a. Receipt, analysis and referral (along with any recommendations it may consider appropriate) of reports from the President under the War Powers Act.
- b. Receipt and review of analytic products of the intelligence community.
- c. Oversight (in conjunction with the executive branch) of the system of information classification discussed above.
- d. Establishment and maintenance of facilities and procedures for storage and handling of classified information and materials supplied to the Congress.
- e. Establishment of a code of conduct to govern the handling by Committee members of classified or sensitive information.

RECOMMENDATION (182)

We propose that the Joint Committee:

- a. Consider the creation of a statutory system of information classification, and (if intelligence oversight is assigned to it).
- b. Be granted authority for annual authorization of funds for the intelligence community.

A central Congressional repository for written reports to Congress from executive branch agencies, efficient procedures for making such reports available to all interested Members, and convenient means for maintaining security of classified reports, should be developed, as proposed above, by the Joint Committee on National Security.

RECOMMENDATION (184)

The Commission recommends that Congress designate the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations as responsible for representing the interests of the Congress as a whole and authorized to provide the Congressional Research Service with policy guidance, assistance in security resources, and some measure of insulation against the lower priority concern which deflect it from sustained work on major issues, thus insuring that some part of the CRS staff is able to focus steadily on issues to which Congress as a whole accords high priority.

RECOMMENDATION (185)

The Commission recommends that the House Commission on Information and Facilities, created as part of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, look with special care at the research support available to Congress when legislating in foreign policy. We also suggest that the Information Commission seek better management of Congressional use of research by designating the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations to oversee research organizations; and that it seek to facilitate wider use by the Congress of the policy research capabilities of universities and non-profit research centers.



RECOMMENDATION (186)

The Commission recommends the publication of a summary of the Foreign and International Relations Committees research interests and priorities.

RECOMMENDATION (187)

In the judgment of the Commission, more extended travel by Members, the preparation of special reports based on staff travel abroad (particularly Foreign and International Relations Committees investigative staff), and increased travel by teams of Members rather than individuals are highly desirable.

RECOMMENDATION (188)

Foreign travel reporting requirements should be extended to the entire Congress, and an improved system of circulating, monitoring and evaluating these reports developed.

RECOMMENDATION (189)

Through carefully organized hearings Congress can provide the critical review of U. S. purposes, and of their relation to shorter-term policy, necessary to test their soundness and coherence, and to generate the public understanding and support without which, in the end, they cannot succeed.

RECOMMENDATION (190)

Recent trends toward opening the deliberations of Congress on major foreign policy issues should be encouraged. Committee hearings should routinely be open for television. At the discretion of the House and Senate, under their respective rules, consideration should also be given to making floor debates on major foreign policy issues available to public and commercial television on a case-by-case basis.

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	D/DCI/IC	X			
9	D/DCI/NIO		X		
10	GC		X		
11	LC		X		
12	IG		X		
13	Compt		X		
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE See attached!  
Date

Remarks: Response for DCI signature. Attachment furnished only to IC [ ] who will parcel out recommendations to appropriate Directorates and offices for comment.

Executive Secretary  
11 July 1975  
Date

3637 (1-75)

STAT

STAT